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NOTES
THE EFFECT OF THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT
ON DETAINERS UPON FEDERAL
PRISONER TRANSFER
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1976, five federal circuit courts' have handed down conflicting
opinions concerning the nature of and policies behind two legal instruments
used to transfer prisoners from one jurisdiction to another-the detainer and
the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum (the writ). A detainer, typically in
the form of a hold order or warrant,2 is a notification by officials in the
accusing jurisdiction to the incarcerating authorities that a prisoner is wanted
to face charges. The jurisdiction which files a detainer requests that, upon
completion of the prisoner's term, the prisoner will be available to the
accusing officials for prosecution. 3 The writ is a federal court order, now
statutory in form, 4 which authorizes a prisoner's immediate delivery for
prosecution by federal authorities. 5
There was apparently no conflict between these two instruments until 1970,
1. United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc); United States v.
Thompson, No. 76-1976 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc); Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d
357 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v.
Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
At publication, the issue was pending in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Speed v. United
States, No. 77-1126 (8th Cir.); United States v. Adkins, No. 76-3526 (9th Cir.), cited in United
States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d at 915 n.7.
2. Note, The Detainer: A Problem in Interstate Criminal Administration, 48 Colum. L.
Rev. 1190, 1190-91 (1948) [hereinafter cited as The Detainer]; Note, 9 Fed. Probation I
(Jul.-Sept. 1945); Note, Convicts-The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes, 18
Rut. L. Rev. 828, 835 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Speedy Trial]; Note, Detainers and the
Correctional Process, 1966 Wash. U.L.Q. 417, 417 [hereinafter cited as Correctional Process].
3. Comment, The Detainer System and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 535,
537 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Detainer System]; The Detainer, supra note 2, at 1191; Note, 9
Fed. Probation 1 (Jul.-Sept. 1945); Correctional Process, supra note 2, at 417; Note, Effective
Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 Yale L.J. 767, 771 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Convicts in Other Jurisdictions].
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge
within their respective jurisdictions . . . . (c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless- . . . (5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial."
5. Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 615 (1961); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75 (1807). The writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum i; not to be confused with the "Great
Writ," or habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which is issued for the purpose of an inquiry into the
cause of restraint. Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. at 615; see 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
*129-31. For the common law origins of the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, see 9 W.
Holdsworth, History of English Law 108 (1926); Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus: A Protean Writ and
Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179, 185 (1948).
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when the United States became a party to the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (Agreement).6 The Agreement was designed to ameliorate the once
debilitating plight of prisoners against whom detainers had been filed, by
establishing cooperative and expeditious procedures to bring about a final
disposition of the pending charges. 7 The conflict among the circuits is whether
the sanctions contained in the Agreement should apply to federal prosecutors'
use of the writ. Since the Agreement makes no mention of the writ, it is
unclear whether that instrument is to be classified as a detainer within the
meaning of the statute. 8
The Second and Third Circuits have interpreted the scope of the Agreement
to include the writ within its purview. 9 They have stressed that since the writ
is similar in function to a detainer and fosters many of the same abuses of
detainer transfer which the Agreement was designed to prevent,' 0 the federal
government should not be permitted to evade the sanctions of the Agreement
when proceeding under the writ.I The First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, on the
other hand, have refused to classify the writ as a detainer under the
Agreement. 1 2 They argue not only that the writ and a detainer serve different
functions, but also that the Agreement was enacted only to end certain abuses
under the detainer system of prisoner transfer, none of which exist when a
6. Pub. L. No. 91-538, §§ 2-8, 84 Stat. 1397 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230-38
(West Supp. 1977). The Agreement is an interstate compact and as such requires congressional
approval. See U.S. Const. art. I., § 10, cl. 1. This approval was given in 1949. 4 U.S.C. § 112(a)
(1970). Twenty-eight states had enacted the Agreement prior to its adoption by the federal
government. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 590 (2d Cir. 1976). cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596). The compact has now been approved by all
but four of the states. Id.
7. The problems of sovereignty and expediency which arise when two or more state or federal
jurisdictions want the same person were not present at common law. All persons convicted of a
felony were immunized from subsequent prosecution, since the punishment for all felonies was
death. Speedy Trial, supra note 2, at 828; see 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 0335-36.
8. Prepassage discussion of the Agreement in both Houses focused only on the need for the
statute; no legislative purpose as to its scope was articulated. See H.R. Rep. No. 1018. 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). reprinted in [1970] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 4864; 116 Cong. Rec. 13999-14000 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier
and Rep. Poff); 116 Cong. Rec. 38840-41 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hruska).
9. United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc); United States v.
Thompson, No. 76-1976 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc); United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4. 1977) (No. 76-1596). The Third
Circuit has also held that a state writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a detainer under the
Agreement. See United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1975).
10. United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647, slip op. at 5-10 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc);
United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.LW. 3214-15
(U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
11. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 594-95 (2d Cir. 1976). cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
12. See Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kenaan,
557 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977); accord,
United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 595 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting). cert.
granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
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prisoner is transferred under a writ.13 In addition, they contend that there is
no evidence that Congress, in adopting the Agreement, intended to repeal the
statute under which the writ is issued and that to hold otherwise would
violate the presumption against implicit repeal of statutes. 14
Prior to enactment of the Agreement, a detainer could remain on file for a
substantial time before the prisoner would be transferred,15 thereby creating
delays which could obstruct the defendant's rehabilitation.16 As a result, the
prisoner might be subjected to such sanctions as automatic denial of parole
and maximum security surveillance. 17 In addition, the delay decreased the
possibility that the prisoner, if convicted of the outstanding charge, could
serve his new sentence concurrently with the old one. 18 The prospect of
another term of imprisonment coupled with the punitive measures already
imposed upon the convict had understandably adverse effects on his ability
and desire to participate in treatment programs. 19
The abuses to which detained prisoners were subject were often flagrant. In
some instances, federal judges or prosecutors filed detainer warrants against
state prisoners for the sole purpose of preventing parole, even though they
had no genuine intention to prosecute the charges. 20 "One prosecutor wrote
that a convict could 'sit and rot in prison' rather than be brought promptly to
13. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 360-62 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 915-17 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1171-73
(5th Cir. 1977).
14. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kenaan,
557 F.2d 912, 917 (ist Cir. 1977); see United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1171-73 (5th Cir.
1977). Since almost all federal transfers are conducted pursuant to the writ, United States v.
Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977)
(No. 77-52), many federal defendants, under these three circuits' decisions, are denied the
protection of the Agreement solely because of "the caption on the paper which produces [them]."
United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15
(U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
15. The Detainer, supra note 2, at 1192.
16. Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, 9 Fed. Probation 8, 9 (Jul.-
Sept. 1945); Speedy Trial, supra note 2, at 835-36; Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, supra note 3,
at 767.
17. Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, 9 Fed. Probation 8, 9 (Jul.-
Sept. 1945); Heyns, The Detainer in a State Correctional System, 9 Fed. Probation 13, 13-14
(Jul.-Sept. 1945); The Detainer, supra note 2, at 835; Speedy Trial, supra note 2, at 835; Detainer
System, supra note 3, at 537; Correctional Process, supra note 2, at 418-20; Convicts in Other
Jurisdictions, supra note 3, at 767.
18. Detainer System, supra note 3, at 537; Correctional Process, supra note 2, at 423;
Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, supra note 3, at 767.
19. Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, 9 Fed. Probation 8, 10
(Jul.-Sept. 1945); Heyns, The Detainer in a State Correctional System, 9 Fed. Probation 13, 14
(Jul.-Sept. 1945); Hincks, The Need for Comity in Criminal Administration, 9 Fed. Probation 3,
3-4 (Jul.-Sept. 1945); The Detainer, supra note 2, at 1192; Speedy Trial, supra note 2, at 835-36;
Correctional Process, supra note 2, at 421-22; Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, supra note 3, at
767.
20. Bates, The Detained Prisoner and His Adjustment, 9 Fed. Probation 16, 17 (Jul.-Sept.
1945).
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trial in the prosecutor's jurisdiction." 2' Even where the jurisdiction which
filed the detainer subsequently dropped the charges, the detainer would
remain in force against the prisoner unless the accusing jurisdiction notified
prison authorities that he was no longer wanted.
22
While the writ, since it generally leads to prompt transfer, might not foster
the same adverse effects on rehabilitation as did the detainer in the period
before the prisoner is delivered, it might well impede rehabilitation in the
post-transfer period.23 The prisoner's arrival in the accusing jurisdiction did
not necessarily eliminate his anxieties over the possibility of prolonged incarc-
eration. 24 Also during this time, the prisoner might be shuttled between the
two jurisdictions. 25 This procedure also disrupted productive participation in
treatment programs, many of which require the prisoner's constant physical
presence. 26 Moreover, the potential for inordinate delay before trial did not
automatically disappear upon transfer.
27
The provisions of the Agreement address both pre-transfer and post-
transfer abuses. In the pre-transfer period its operation may be triggered by
either the prisoner or the accusing jurisdiction. If a detainer has been filed,
the convict has the right to demand trial on the underlying charges. If he
exercises that right, trial must be held within 180 days of the demand.2 8 If,
after filing a detainer, the prosecutor wishes to obtain custody of the accused,
he must file a request with the incarcerating jurisdiction. 29 After a thirty-day
21. Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, supra note 3, at 772.
22. The Detainer, supra note 2, at 1193.
23. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
24. Id. at 593.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
26. United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 837 (3d Cir. 1975).
27. But see the discussion of the Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. V
1975), which creates statutory maximum periods within which trials of federal defendants must
be had, at notes 171-78 infra and accompanying text.
28. Section 2, art. I11(a) of the Agreement provides: "Whenever a person has entered upon a
term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional instutution of a party State, and whenever during
the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party State any untried
indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against
the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have
caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting
officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final
disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint ... ." Agreement § 2, art.
I11(a), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231 (West Supp. 1977).
29. Section 2, art IV(a) provides: "The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an
untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner
against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party
State made available in accordance with article V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request
for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the State in which the
prisoner is incarcerated. Provided, That the court having jurisdiction of such indictment,
information, or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded, and transmitted the request: And
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waiting period, during which the governor of the imprisoning jurisdiction
may deny the request,30 transfer becomes mandatory. 31 After the prisoner's
arrival in the receiving jurisdiction, the post-transfer provisions of the Agree-
ment require that he be tried within 120 days. 32 Continuances beyond these
time limitations are allowed for "good cause. .13 However, if the prisoner is
returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial or is not tried
within the applicable period, the indictment, information, or complaint "shall
not be of any further force or effect," and must be dismissed with prejudice. 34
The Agreement concludes wiith the exhortation that it be "liberally construed
so as to effectuate its purposes. '35
This Note will argue that, in the absence of Congress' express exclusion of
the writ from the Agreement, it seems both sensible and just to classify that
instrument as a detainer within the meaning of the Agreement. The functional
differences between the writ and a detainer do not justify a refusal to subject
federal prosecutors' use of the writ to the sanctions of the compact. 36 The
Agreement is designed to remedy the abuses faced by prisoners having
outstanding charges in other jurisdictions. 37 As will be seen, transfer under
the writ can generate similar abuses.3 8 To allow the federal government to
evade the sanctions of the Agreement simply by utilization of this alternative
method of acquiring defendants is inconsistent with the Agreement's mandate
that it be liberally construed, 39 and allows perpetuation of the evils which it
was created to forestall. 40 This Note also argues that a judicial decision
provided further, That there shall be a period of thirty clays after receipt by the appropriate
authorities before the request be honored, within which period the Governor of the sending State
may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or
upon motion of the prisoner." Agreement § 2, art. IV(a), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 232 (West Supp.
1977). The Second Circuit has held that the writ operates as both a detainer and a request within
this provision. United States. v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 589-90, 592 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596); see United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732,
742 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
30. Under the terms of the Agreement, the word " 'State' shall mean a State of the United
States; the United States of America; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." Agreement § 2, art. II(a), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at
230 (West Supp. 1977).
31. See note 29 supra.
32. Section 2, art. IV(c) provides: "In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article,
trial shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the
receiving State ...." Agreement § 2, art. IV(c), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 232 (West Supp. 1977).
33. The good cause must be "shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present
." Agreement § 2, arts. 111(a), IV(c), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231, 232 (West Supp. 1977).
34. Agreement § 2, arts. III(d), IV(e), V(c), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231, 232, 233 (West Supp.
1977).
35. Agreement § 2, art. IX, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 234 (West Supp. 1977).
36. See pt. 11(B) infra.
37. United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 836 (3d Cir. 1975); see Detainer
System, supra note 3, at 551.
38. See pt. II(B) infra.
39. Agreement § 2, art. IX, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 234 (West Supp. 1977).
40. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 594-95 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
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recognizing the inclusion of the writ within the Agreement will probably be
given prospective effect only, 41 and that prisoners will receive no right to
attack their convictions collaterally on the basis of the Agreement.4 2 This
should dispel any concern 43 that such a decision will result in the release of
large numbers of federal convicts who have been transferred pursuant to the
writ in unwitting violation of the Agreement.
This Note is divided into two parts. The first is an examination of the
controversy in the circuits, 44 and is subdivided into three areas of discussion:
(a) an attempt to ascertain whether Congress intended that the writ be
included as a detainer within the meaning of the Agreement;45 (b) an analysis
of the theoretical and functional differences between the two instruments;46
and (c) a study of the abuses fostered by each, as they relate to the purposes of
the Agreement. 47
The second part proceeds on the assumption that the position which will
ultimately prevail is that of the Second and Third Circuits48 -that the writ
must be classified as a detainer within the Agreement. This part will analyze
the issues of retroactivity and collateral attack, as they relate to those
decisions. 49
I. CLASSIFICATION OF THE WRIT
AS A DETAINER
A. Legislative History of the Agreement
The circuit courts are split on the issue of whether Congress intended, by
enacting the Agreement, to repeal or modify the earlier statute which granted
to federal courts the power to issue the writ. 50 If this was Congress' design,
then the Agreement may be characterized as the "exclusive means of effecting
a transfer""1 of prisoners to federal jurisdictions for prosecution. The legisla-
tive history prior to the Agreement's enactment, however, provided little
guidance on this question, since it made no reference to either the writ or the
exclusive nature of the Agreement. 52 The courts then resorted to several
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596); United Statesex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830,
837 (3d Cir. 1975).
41. See pt. III(A) infra.
42. See pt. I(B) infra.
43. See United States v. Thompson, No. 76-1976, slip op. at 23 & n. 1 (3d Cir. Aug. 22. 1977)
(en banc) (Garth, j., dissenting).
44. See pt. H1 infra.
45. See pt. II(A) infra.
46. See pt. II(B) infra.
47. See pt. II(C) infra.
48. See United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en bane); United States
v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4. 1977)
(No. 76-1596); note 9 supra and accompanying text.
49. See pt. III infra.
50. See notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text.
51. United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1171 (5th Cir. 1977).
52. See note 8 supra. The sparse legislative history may be attributed in part to the
uncontested approval given to the Agreement by both Houses of Congress. 116 Cong. Rec.
14000 (House), 38842 (Senate) (1970).
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theories of statutory interpretation, shaping them to fit their respective
conclusions.
The First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits found that Congress' failure to mention
the writ in any of the proceedings or reports prior to passage of the Agreement
demonstrates that the statute authorizing the writ was not intended to be
affected.5 3 Therefore, they reasoned, the Agreement is not the exclusive
means of transporting prisoners for prosecution.54 According to these circuits,
a holding that transfer under the writ must be subject to the sanctions of the
Agreement would violate the rule of statutory construction that, when Con-
gress has enacted legislation on a particular subject, subsequent legislation
will not be construed to modify or repeal it.55 Since the two statutes are not
inconsistent, they should be allowed to stand together.
56
The Fifth Circuit went further, and attempted to glean from the language
of the Senate and House Judiciary Committee reports a clear congressional
intent that the Agreement not be exclusive.5 7 The court first argued that the
Committee's description of the Agreement as "a method" of securing prisoners
from other jurisdictions indicates that it was not intended to be the sole
method.5 8 This "plain language" demonstrated that Congress did not intend
to repeal the writ statute.5 9 The court then referred to other excerpts from the
reports which indicated that the abuses sought to be remedied had been
perpetrated by the states, not the federal government. 60 That the reports cited
only cases which related to unreasonable delay by the states in bringing
federal prisoners to trial was deemed "significant" by the court. 6' Taken out
53. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kennan,
557 F.2d 912, 917 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1171-73 (5th Cir.
1977); see United States v. Thompson, No. 76-1976, slip op. at 17 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en
banc) (Weis, J., dissenting); United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 595-97 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
54. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Scallion,
548 F.2d 1168, 1171 (5th Cir. 1977); see United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 917 (1st Cir.
1977).
55. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kenaan,
557 F.2d 912, 917 (1st Cir. 1977); see United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 597 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
56. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kenaan,
557 F.2d 912, 917 (1st Cir. 1977); see United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 597 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Mansfield J., dissenting), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
57. United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1171-73 (5th Cir. 1977).
58. Id. at 1171 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1172 n.5.
61. Id. at 1173 n.6; see United States v. Thompson, No. 76-1976, slip op. at 28-33 (3d Cir.
Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc) (Garth, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinions in Thompson discuss the
problems of interpretation involved when the United States became a party to a compact which
the original drafters intended to apply primarily to interstate transfers. Id. at 14-37 (Weis &
Garth, J.J., dissenting). For example, art. IV of the Agreement requires that trial must be held
within 120 days of the prisoner's arrival in the receiving state. However, if the prisoner is being
transferred from a state prison to a federal court in the same state the prisoner has been in the
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of context, these statements might support an argument that the Agreement
was not intended to be the exclusive means of transfer. The Senate and House
committees, however, used these cases only to illustrate the abuses which
detainers generated; they did not intend them as proof that the federal
government, when operating through the writ, could not be guilty of similar
abuses.
62
The Second Circuit, while agreeing that implicit repeals are not favored,
found that subjecting the writ to the sanctions of the Agreement does not
impute a congressional intent to repeal the older statute. 63 When the Agree-
ment was offered to Congress in 1970, the Second Circuit reasoned, only
twenty-five states had adopted it.64 Therefore the writ was still necessary to
transfer prisoners to and from the nonparticipating states. 6S Congress, then,
could not have intended to repeal the statute authorizing the writ. 6 6
Now that most states have adopted the Agreement, 67 it would seem that, if
federal prosecutors must comply with its provisions when utilizing the writ,
the Agreement is indeed the "exclusive means" of transfer. It does not follow,
however, that the writ is thereby repealed. The writ is still available as a
means of obtaining prisoners for prosecution even in those jurisdictions which
have adopted the Agreement. 68 As the Third Circuit has observed, applica-
receiving state continuously. Id. at 15 (Weis, J., dissenting). Similarly, art. IV(e) requires that the
prisoner not be returned to the sending state prior to trial. If the prisoner in the above
hypothetical were returned to state prison prior to trial, he would never have left the state and
hence could not be "returned" in the geographical sense of that term. Id. at 24-25 (Garth, J.,
dissenting). These problems might be resolved if the terms "arrival" and "return" refer to
transfers of custody. The ambiguities of the Agreement concerning which jurisdiction retains
custody of the prisoner during the transfer process, however, indicated to Judge Garth that
transfers of custody are not the triggering events for operation of the Agreement. Id. at 24-33; see
Agreement § 2, arts. V(a), V(d), V(g), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 232-33 (West Supp. 1977). Other
provisions of the Agreement also indicate the difficulty in interpretation. Thus, art. V(h) refers to
a prisoner's return to the "territory and custody of the sending State .... I"d. art V(h). As Judge
Garth observed, however, "[1It does not make sense to speak of a return to the 'territory ... of
the sending state' when that 'state' is the United States." United States v. Thompson, No. 76-22,
slip op. at 30 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc) (Garth, J., dissenting).
62. The cases cited by the Senate Report were Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969), and
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970). Sen. Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
[1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4864, 4864. These cases were important to the Committee
on the Judiciary because enactment of the Agreement "would afford defendants in criminal cases
the right to a speedy trial and diminish the possibility of convictions being vacated or reversed
because of a denial of this right." Id.
63. See United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
64. Id.
65. Id. The four remaining nonparticipating states are Alabama, Alaska, Mississippi, and
Oklahoma. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647, slip op. at 7-8 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en
banc).
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tion of the Agreement to transfers under the writ would affect only the
procedures that the federal government must follow after the writ has been
executed.
69
The issue of congressional intent took a more confusing turn in 1975. The
Senate Judiciary Committee in that year issued a report in connection with
the proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975 (S. 1).70 In its report, the
committee commented on the status of the writ under the Agreement. It
concluded that Congress did not intend to limit the scope of the writ when it
enacted the Agreement, since the writ had always been an essential part of the
mechanism for guaranteeing prisoners' speedy trial rights. 7 1 In addition, the
committee proposed that the Agreement be amended to provide for federal
participation only when state detainers are lodged against federal prisoners,
or, in the Agreement's language, only when the federal government is a
"sending state."'72 Twelve of the fifteen members of the committee had
69. Id. at 8. A more appropriate question is whether the statute authorizing the writ Is
rendered obsolete by the Agreement. Under the latter, a request for immediate custody may be
made directly to the imprisoning authorities; unlike the procedure under the writ, judicial
permission need not be obtained. Agreement § 2, art. IV(a), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 127-28 (West
Supp. 1977). It seems easier, then, to utilize the Agreement and thereby obviate court action in
acquiring a prisoner. The Agreement also requires, however, that prior to a request for custody, a
detainer must have already been filed. Id. The Second Circuit's holding in United States v.
Mauro, 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No.
76-1596), that a writ operates as both a detainer and a request for custody under the Agreement
eliminates the necessity of filing two documents in order lo trigger the statutory mechanism. See
United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15
(U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52). The obsolescence of the statute authorizing the writ will probably
be determined by which of these two alternative procedures proves most convenient to federal
prosecutors.
70. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 597 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596). The report is cited in United
States v. Thompson, No. 76-1976, slip op. at 16 n.1 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977), as Sen. Rep. 94-00,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 983-84 (1975).
71. The report states in pertinent part: "Federal prosecution authorities and all Federal
defendants have always had and continue to have recourse to a speedy trial in a Federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5), the Federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The
Committee does not intend, nor does it believe that the Congress in enacting the Agreement in
1970 intended, to limit the scope and applicability of that writ." United States v. Mauro, 544
F.2d 588, 597 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S.
Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
72. Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The committee has recently modified the proposed
amendment to the Agreement to provide for United States participation "as a 'sending state' for
purposes of Articles III and IV, but as a 'receiving state' for purposes of Article III only ....
Interview with Paul Summitt, Chief Counsel, Senate Criminal Law Subcommittee (Nov. 8, 1977)
(Criminal Justice Reform Act, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)). In other words, the United
States is to be a full participant to the Agreement in all cases except where a federal prosecutor,
after filing a detainer against a state prisoner, makes a request for custody of that prisoner. This
amends the 1975 proposal insofar as it declares that the federal government must comply with the
Agreement whenever a state prisoner against whom a federal detainer has been filed demands
trial on the underlying charges. See Agreement § 2, art. III, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231-32 (West
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subscribed to the original report advocating passage of the Agreement." If
these remarks were accepted as conclusive proof of congressional intent, the
non-exclusive nature of the Agreement could not be disputed. Their sig-
nificance, however, is questionable.
Courts generally give less weight in ascertaining legislative intent to subse-
quent legislative history, such as the S. 1 report, than to statements made
prior to enactment of a statute. 74 Later remarks may nevertheless be persua-
sive, depending on the circumstances. 7- The Sixth Circuit pointed to the S. i
report as an important indication of congressional intent.7 6 Judge Mansfield,
dissenting from the Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. Mauro,7 7
noted that the committee membership was substantially the same as in 1970
when it reported out the Agreement. 78 The majority in Mauro, however,
declared that the report was unimportant in construing the Agreement, since
the 1975 bill to which it was addressed had not yet been enacted.7 9 The Third
Circuit agreed, adding that the report concerned "completely separate pro-
posed legislation . . . [and therefore] is a 'hazardous basis' for inferring"
Congress' intent in 1970.80
The S. 1 report may be entitled to greater weight than the Second and Third
Circuits were willing to give it. Courts have looked to several factors when
examining subsequent congressional statements, including the official nature
of the statement, the person or body by whom it is made, and the length of
time between enactment of the statute and the later remarks . 8  Given the
Supp. 1977). The new proposal, however, continues the 1975 report's recommendation that the
Agreement should be inapplicable to the federal government whenever a federal prosecutor
requests custody of the detained state prisoner. See Agreement § 2, art. IV, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at
232-33 (West Supp. 1977).
73. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 597 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
74. See Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 983, 988 (Cust. Ct.
1972), affd per curiam, 494 F.2d 703 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
75. Id.
76. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977).
77. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cerf. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15
(U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
78. Id. at 597 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 594 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
80. United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647, slip op. at 8 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc)
(quoting Benevento v. United States, 461 F.2d 1316, 1322 (Ct. Cl. 1972)).
81. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974); Talley v.
Mathews, 550 F.2d 911, 920 (4th Cir. 1977); Daniels v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 942, 949-50
(D. Mont. 1962) (per curiam), aff'd per curiam, 372 U.S. 704 (1963); Abell v. United States, 518
F.2d 1369, 1382 (CL CL. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1977); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v.
United States, 340 F. Supp. 983, 988 (Cust. Ct. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 494 F.2d 703 (C.C.P.A.
1974).
For example, in Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942), the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs had declared in an official report that the Indian Allotment Act of
1887, which the same committee had reported five years earlier, did not confer title to "executive
order" reservations on Indians, but that title to those lands remained in the United States. Id. at
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official nature of the S. 1 report, and the fact that it was made only five years
after passage of the Agreement by a majority of the members of the same
committee which had originally reported the statute, its statements cannot be
taken lightly in determining congressional intent.
It should be noted, nevertheless, that notwithstanding the importance of
the S. 1 report in ascertaining Congress' intent in 1970, the conclusions of the
report are inconsistent with both the provisions and purposes of the Agree-
ment. The committee's proposal that the federal government participate in the
Agreement only in the capacity of sending state suffers from several flaws.82
First, as several courts have observed, the proposal contradicts the express
terms of the statute.83 Article II includes the United States as a "State" within
the meaning of the Agreement, 4 and article VIII provides that the Agreement
"shall enter into full force and effect as to a party State . , "85 By the terms
of the Agreement, therefore, the United States is a party to the same extent as
any other participating state. 86 It is, therefore, subject to the sanctions of the
statute when it transfers prisoners from other jurisdictions under a detainer.8 7
Moreover, the committee's argument that prisoners transferred to federal
jurisdictions by means of the writ have always enjoyed speedy trials, and that
it is therefore unnecessary to include the writ as a detainer under the
Agreement, is, as will be discussed below, 88 an assumption not always borne
out by experience.
329. The Supreme Court deemed those remarks "virtually conclusive as to the significance of that
Act." Id. at 329-30. The case demonstrates that much importance may be attached to postpassage
congressional statements. It should be noted, however, that, unlike the S. I report, the sub-
sequent statements in Sioux Tribe corroborated remark.; to the same effect which had been
made prior to enactment of the statute in question. Id. at 329. In addition, the report in Sioux
Tribe was to a bill which was not yet enacted. Id. While this is a factor to be considered, it does
not render the subsequent statement irrelevant. Talley v. Mathews, 550 F.2d 911, 920 n.22 (4th
Cir. 1977); see Daniels v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D. Mont. 1962) (per curlam),
aff'd per curiam, 372 U.S. 704 (1963).
82. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 173 n.15 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The committee has modified its position on this point. See the discussion note 72
supra.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977)
(No. 76-1596); United States v. Sorrell, 413 F. Supp. 138, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afjtd, No. 76-1647
(3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc).
84. Agreement § 2, art. 11(a), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977).
85. Agreement § 2, arts. II, VIII, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230, 234 (West Supp. 1977).
86. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
87. Id. But see United States v. Thompson, No. 76-1976, slip op. at 16 (3d Cir. Aug. 22,
1977) (en banc) (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis argued that characterization of the United
States as a "sending state" alone "makes the statute workable and reasonable," and that by
including the United States as a "receiving state" as well "Congress has attempted to fit a square
peg into a round hole." Id. It is debatable whether the peg becomes any rounder if the federal
government is a sending state. For example, how can a federal prisoner transferred to a state
court in the same state be "returned" to the sending state? See Agreement § 2, arts. IV(e), V(e), 18
U.S.C.A. app., at 232-33 (West Supp. 1977); see notes 61 supra and 182 infra.
88. See pt. II(C) infra.
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B. Functional Similarities Between
the Writ and a Detainer
A detainer, as noted above, advises the incarcerating authorities that the
prisoner is wanted to face charges in another jurisdiction and requests
notification of his release date. 89 A detainer may be filed, without judicial
approval, by administrative officers such as prosecuting attorneys, sheriffs,
wardens, or parole and probation officers. 90 It need not be accompanied by an
indictment. 91 Prior to the Agreement, the jurisdiction holding the prisoner
would elect either to transfer the prisoner immediately or to hold him until the
end of his sentence, at which time, if the charges against him were still
outstanding, 92 he was delivered to the requesting authorities. 93
The writ has existed for centuries at common law94 and is now codified in a
federal statute. 95 It is issued by the court in which the prisoner will be tried
only after the prosecutor shows that he is "entitled thereto." 96 The instrument
itself is typically drafted in language of command. 97 Once it is issued the
prisoner is generally transferred immediately.98
The two characteristics of a writ which most clearly distinguish it from a
89. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. In the legislative history to federal enactment of
the Agreement, a detainer was defined as a "notification filed with the institution in which a
prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to stand trial on pending criminal
charges in another jurisdiction." 116 Cong. Rec. 13999 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
The report of the House Judiciary Committee duplicated this language. H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 91st
Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1970). The Senate Judiciary Committee's definition was almost identical. S.
Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4864,
4865.
90. The Detainer, supra note 2, at 1191; see Schindler, Interjurisdictional Conflict and the
Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 U. Cin. L. Rev. 179, 181 & n.9 (1966).
91. Correctional Process, supra note 2, at 417.
92. The charges upon which many detainers were based were never prosecuted. See notes
20-22 supra and accompanying text; notes 149-53 infra and accompanying text.
93. Prior to the Agreement, this discretion was proper because a detainer was complied with
strictly as a matter of comity. See, e.g., May v. Georgia, 409 F.2d 203, 204 (5th Cir. 1969);
Schindler, Intedjurisdictional Conflict and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 U. Cin. L. Rev. 179,
185 (1966). The Agreement reduces the period of discretion to thirty days, after which the
prisoner, if the accusing authorities so request, must be delivered for trial. See Agreement § 2,
art. IV(a), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 232 (Vest Supp. 1977).
94. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *129; 9 Holdsworth, History of English Law 108-12
(1926).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1970). See Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 614-19 (1961),
for a discussion of the historical development of the writ in the United States. Originally codified
in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 81-82, under the generic term habeas corpus, it was not
specifically referred to by Congress until 1948, when § 2241 was enacted. 364 U.S. at 619.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970) provides: "A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for
a writ of heabeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent
to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appearsfrom the application that the
applicant . . . is not entitled thereto." (emphasis added.)
97. See sample form in Annot., 5 L. Ed. 2d 964, 966 (1961).
98. See Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 916 (Ist Cir. 1977); United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. OcL 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
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detainer are its mandatory nature and its effect of producing a prompt
transfer of the prisoner.9 9 By its terms it commands the prisoner's release,10 0
and it may be issued only by a court after a determination both that the
government's purpose is to prosecute the prisoner and that proper grounds for
the charges against him exist. 10 1 A detainer, on the other hand, is more like a
notice than an order, 0 2 and may be filed by administrative authorities
without judicial review. 10 3 In addition, periods of delay prior to transfer may
subject prisoners to penalties which obstruct their participation in rehabilita-
tion programs. 10 4 Those sanctions are not imposed under the writ, because
receipt of a writ by the imprisoning authorities generally leads to the pris-
oner's immediate conveyance to the accusing jurisdiction.
Despite these differences, the Second and Third Circuits have held that the
writ is "substantially" identical to a detainer as that term was defined in the
legislative history to the Agreement.' 0 5 The Second Circuit in Mauro, 0 6 with
which the Third Circuit is in accord, 10 7 reasoned that the writ is indeed a
notification to prison officials that a prisoner is wanted to face charges in
another jurisdiction. 10 8 The majority of the panel regarded the mandatory
language of the writ as inconsequential, arguing that the words of command
amount to no more than a request which a state may in its discretion choose
to dishonor. ' 0 9
The majority dismissed the Government's contention that the writ, since it
is executed at once, has none of the adverse effects upon rehabilitation which
the Agreement was designed to prevent.' ° Noting that a primary goal of the
Agreement is to avoid the "uncertainties" which impede a prisoner's participa-
99. United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1173 (5th Cir. 1977).
100. Annot., 5 L. Ed. 2d 964, 966 (1961).
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
102. See sources cited notes 2-3 supra.
103. See Schindler, Interjurisdictional Conflict and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 179, 181 & n.9 (1966).
104. See pt. II(B) infra.
105. See United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647, slip op. at 5-9 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en
banc); United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
106. 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977)
(No. 76-1596).
107. See United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647, slip op. at 7 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc).
The court in Sorrell declared that the facts of that case were identical to those in Mauro. Id. It
should be noted, however, that, unlike the situation in Mauro, a detainer had been filed against
the defendent in Sorrell before the writ was served. United States v. Thompson, No. 76-1976,
slip op. at 19 n.5 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc) (Weis, J., dissenting); see United States v.
Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977)
(No. 77-52).
108. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
109. Id. at 592.
110. Id. at 592-93.
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tion in treatment programs, they maintained that shuttling prisoners between
jurisdictions contributes to those uncertainties."
The First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, emphasizing the procedural differences
between a writ and a detainer, have held that the writ cannot be classified as
a detainer under the Agreement. 11 2 The courts concluded that since the writ is
executed immediately, it results in none of the adverse effects upon rehabilita-
tion which longstanding detainers may foster." 13 Moreover, the courts argued,
the writ has more of an effect than merely conveying notice of outstanding
charges. As a federal court order, its commanding language may not be
disregarded by the state of incarceration.11 4 In support of that argument, the
First Circuit and the dissent in Mauro asserted that refusal by a state to
comply with the writ would violate the supremacy clause.'1 s
No matter how great the differences between the writ and the detainer may
have been at common law, there is much more similarity in the function of
the two instruments now that the Agreement has modified prisoner transfer
practices under a detainer. If the governor of the incarcerating jurisdiction
does not reject a request for custody, pursuant to a detainer within thirty
days, then the prisoner must be transferred. 1,6 Conversely, if a prisoner learns
that a detainer has been lodged against him, he has the right to demand
transfer and trial on the underlying charges.117 These provisions severely
curtail the right of a state to choose not to comply with a detainer, thus giving
the detainer a mandatory nature more closely resembling that of the writ.
Moreover, even at common law, a state could elect to deliver a prisoner
against whom a detainer had been filed to the accusing authorities for
immediate prosecution."18 These considerations weaken the justifications for
111. Id. Article IV(e) of the Agreement imposes sanctions against shuttling. Agreement § 2.
art. IV(e), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 232 (West Supp. 1977).
112. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kenaan, 557
F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977); accord, United
States v. lauro, 544 F.2d 588, 595-97 (2d Cir. 1976) (lansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
113. See Ridgeway v. United States, 5S8 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 916-17 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1172-73
(5th Cir. 1977).
114. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kenaan,
557 F.2d 912, 916 n.8 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1173 (Sth Cir.
1977).
115. United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 916 n.8 (1st Cir. 1977); accord, United States v.
Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 595 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted. 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596). The majority in Mauro ignored this argument, but
denied that the federal writ must be obeyed by the states, arguing that the sending jurisdiction's
cooperation was necessary in order to effectuate the prisoner's transfer. 544 F.2d at 592.
116. Agreement § 2, art. IV(a), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 232 (West Supp. 1977).
117. Agreement § 2, art. 1"1(a), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231 (West Supp. 1977).
118. See United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 915-16 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v.
Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 595 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596). Conversely, in at least one case a state was able to
defer transfer of its prisoner to federal authorities even though a writ of habeas corpus ad
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distinguishing the two instruments on the procedural basis that one is an
order and the other mere notice.
The question of whether the writ must be obeyed under the supremacy
clause, 1 9 and is therefore unlike a detainer because it is a command, may be
answered by examining the purposes of the supremacy clause. Although there
is some authority that the writ is enforceable under the supremacy clause,1 20
the issue is unresolved, since there are apparently no cases in which a state
has refused to comply with the writ.1 2 1 While there is no rigid formula for
determining whether a state law or action violates the supremacy clause, ' 22 a
general test which has been employed by the Supreme Court is whether the
state law or action operates to frustrate the purposes of the federal statute. 123
Should a state refuse to obey the federal writ, there are two federal policies
which may be frustrated. The first is that of allowing federal courts to obtain
custody of prisoners outside of their respective jurisdictions. 24  Non-
prosequendum had been issued. United States v. Oliver, 523 F.2d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1975). In
Oliver the writ was not executed immediately because state charges against the prisoner had not
yet been disposed of.
119. The Agreement, of course, is not honored as a matter of supremacy. It is essentially an
interstate compact which the United States has joined as a party state. Section 2 of the Agreement
provides: "The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered into by
the United States on its own behalf and on behalf of the District of Columbia with all jurisdictions
legally joining ...." Agreement § 2, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis
added). Furthermore, each state which is a party to the Agreement may withdraw by repealing
its particular statute. Agreement § 2, art. VIII, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 234 (West Supp. 1977). The
federal government, in its capacity as participating state, may not enforce compliance with the
Agreement by resort to the supremacy clause.
120. See Schindler, Interjurisdictional Conflict and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 179, 191-92 (1966); note 115 supra and accompanying text. "Undoubtedly a case so
holding would yield an exception where the state was actually in the trial process or very close
thereto." Schindler, supra at 192 n.46; see, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 523 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.
1975); cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971) (federal courts will not lightly interfere
with state court proceedings).
121. There is authority that the writ is obeyed only as a matter of comity. See Ponzi v.
Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260 (1922); McDonald v. Ciccone, 409 F.2d 28, 30 (8th Cir. 1969);
United States ex rel. Moses v. Kipp, 232 F.2d 147, 150 (7th Cir. 1956). The Fifth Circuit,
although it found resolution of this issue to be unnecessary in order to reach its decision, noted
that the above cited authority either consisted of dicta or was decided prior to the 1948 Act which
explicitly codified the writ. United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1173 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977).
122. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The principle of comity dictates that the
states be left free to perform their "separate functions" with minimal interference from the federal
government. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). When, however, those functions operate
to subject the federal government to local controls, conflicts are introduced which it is the purpose
of the supremacy clause to avoid. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183
(1944).
123. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912);
see United States v. Mayo, 47 F. Supp. 552, 557 (N.D. Fla. 1942), offd, 319 U.S. 441 (1943).
124. The Supreme Court has held that federal courts have the power to issue writs of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum outside of their respective jurisdictions. See Carbo v. United States, 364
U.S. 611 (1961). The Court reasoned that the writ would be of no utility if it could not be issued
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compliance with the writ by a state located beyond the jurisdiction of a
federal court would in effect confine the court's power to issue the writ to the
geographical boundaries of its district. 12- The second policy is that of guaran-
teeing the constitutional right of defendants to a speedy trial. 12 6 Since the writ
is intended to bring an accused into federal custody for prosecution,' 2 7 its
execution, by bringing him before the accusing authorities, presumably aids
him in procuring a speedy trial. 28 In the interest of protecting that right, the
prosecuting jurisdiction must make reasonable efforts to procure the defen-
dant even though he is jailed in another jurisdiction. 129 State disobedience of
the writ, it may be argued, would thwart such efforts, and thereby infringe
upon the prisoner's sixth amendment guarantees. t30
beyond the boundaries of the federal court's jurisdiction, and therefore that it should suffer no
territorial limitations on its use. Id. at 618-21. Accordingly, it rejected the contention of
petitioner, a New York State prisoner, that a California district court had no power to issue the
writ to New York officials. Id. at 612-13.
125. This would clearly frustrate the federal policy behind the writ, and, consequently, would
violate the supremacy clause. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
126. U.S. Const. amend. VI. In addition, state disobedience of the writ would deny the
statutory rights of federal defendants under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174
(Supp. V 1975). See discussion of the Act as it relates to writ transfers, notes 171-78 infra and
accompanying text.
127. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 74, 97, 4 Cranch 75, 98 (1807).
128. See McDonald v. Ciccone, 409 F.2d 28, 30 (8th Cir. 1969).
129. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 36-38 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969)
130. U.S. Const. amend. VI. An analogous situation was presented in Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958), in which the Governor of Arkansas had refused to obey the mandate of the
Supreme Court to eliminate enforced racial segregation in state public schools. Id. at 4. (The
Supreme Court had earlier held in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that such
segregation violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Accordingly it had
decreed that the states promptly initiate a program of gradual integration. Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).) The Governor of Arkansas dispatched troops to Central High School
in Little Rock to prevent Negro students from entering. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U S. at 9. The
Constitution, the Court declared, is the supreme law of the land, and the federal judiciary is the
supreme determinor of what that law is. Id. at 18. Accordingly, no state agency could disobey the
desegregation order, since to do so would nullify the constitutional rights which had been
established, id. at 17, and would be inconsistent with the duty of all state officers to uphold the
Constitution, id. at 18.
A state's refusal to transfer a prisoner pursuant to a writ is dissimilar to the situation in Cooper,
in that no federal court has held that the writ guarantees defendants an enforceable constitutional
right to a speedy trial. In fact, in contrast with Cooper, noncompliance need not automatically
result in the denial of that right. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1973); Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972). Actual delay before trial because of continued incarceration in the
holding jurisdiction is only one of the factors courts will consider in deciding whether there has
been a speedy trial violation. The reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and
prejudice suffered as a result of the delay, must also be weighed. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at
530-33. Thus, if a prisoner were not prejudiced by the delay or preferred not to assert his speedy
trial rights, his sixth amendment guarantee might not be violated, id.. in which case the federal
government's policy of protecting those rights would not be frustrated. Disobedience of the writ,
however, would certainly reduce the chances that such protection would be implemented and
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
The fact that the supremacy clause may mandate the enforcement of the
writ, thereby making the writ an inherent command, 13' may nevertheless not
provide completely satisfactory grounds upon which to distinguish that in-
strument from a detainer. In the first place, the fact that a detainer is not
obeyed as a matter of supremacy does not alter its quasi-mandatory nature
under the Agreement. 132 Moreover, focusing on the logical validity of these
procedural distinctions can disguise the fact that a writ and a detainer serve
the same purpose-interjurisdictional transfer of prisoners.133 The Agreement
was designed to correct the abuses fostered by that process. 134 It would seem,
therefore, that the question as to whether the writ should be classified as a
detainer under the Agreement is better answered by determining if transfer
under the writ leads to the maladies formerly associated with detainers.
C. Abuses Corrected by the Agreement
Possibly the strongest argument for classifying the writ as a detainer under
the Agreement is that some of the abuses which the Agreement was designed
to alleviate are present when prisoners are transferred to federal jurisdictions
pursuant to the writ. 135 The three main purposes of the Agreement are (1) to
establish more cooperative procedures for interjurisdictional transfers, (2) to
minimize the adverse effects of a filed detainer on a prisoner's rehabilitation,
and (3) to promote the "expeditious and orderly disposition" of the charges
against him. 136 The instances in which utilization of the writ permits evasion
of these purposes will be examined below.
would also be inconsistent with the state officials' duty to uphold the Constitution. Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. at 18. Moreover, it seems unlikely that a court would sanction the right of a state
to ignore the writ simply because the prisoner's sixth amendment guarantees are not thereby
automatically nullified.
131. See United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647, slip op. at 5 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc);
United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15
(U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
132. Agreement § 2, art. IV(a), 18 U.S.C.A. app.. at 232 (West Supp. 1977).
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1970); sources cited note 3 supra.
134. Agreement § 2, art. I, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977).
135. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 591-93 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596); see United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d
830, 837 (3d Cir. 1975). If the writ is excluded from the Agreement's provisions, federal
prosecutors may, by proceeding under that document, avoid the possibility that their indictments
will be dismissed for failing to try the prisoner within the statutory period. One flaw in the
Agreement is that it is not triggered until a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, See
Agreement § 2, arts. III(a), IV(a), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231-32 (West Supp. 1977); Convicts in
Other Jurisdictions, supra note 3, at 775. Prosecutors may therefore evade its sanctions in every
instance by waiting until the prisoner's term is almost ompleted before seeking custody. This
situation is ameliorated by the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, which penalizes government attorneys
for failing either to secure the presence of or file a detainer against a prisoner charged with an
offense, if the prisoner's whereabouts are known to the attorney. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(), 3162
(Supp. V 1975).
136. Agreement § 2, art. I, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977). But see Speedy
Trial, supra note 2, at 855.
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The policy of the Agreement to promote cooperative methods of transfer
seems to justify including the writ within the purview of the statute. 37 When
a jurisdiction becomes a participant in the Agreement, it relinquishes its claim
to exclusive control over a prisoner during the sentence imposed by its
courts.' 3 8 In return, it gains the right to proceed with its rehabilitation
programs without the interference inherent in the long pretrial delays and
unnecessary transfers to the receiving jurisdiction. t39 If a receiving jurisdic-
tion can sidestep the Agreement by utilizing the writ, the sending jurisdiction
loses the right to conduct uninterrupted rehabilitation programs, and incurs
the very disadvantages which it joined the Agreement to avoid. This in turn
reduces the motivation of the sending jurisdiction to operate within the
Agreement when seeking custody of prisoners in the jurisdiction which
avoided the Agreement's sanctions by using the writ. Cooperation is conse-
quently discouraged.
Classification of the writ as a detainer also seems justified in view of the
rehabilitative purposes of the Agreement. 140 This point may be more fully
understood if preceded by a discussion of the potential abuses to which
prisoners with detainers were subject prior to the Agreement. The impedi-
ments to rehabilitation fostered by the detainer system are well doc-
umented. 14 1 A prosecutor with pending charges against a person serving a
sentence in another jurisdiction could file a detainer with the prison au-
thorities and thereby delay holding a trial until the prisoner's term was
completed.' 42 This, in addition to denying the defendant a speedy trial, 43
137. "The party States also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and
detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of
cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative
procedures." Agreement § 2, art. I, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977).
138. See Agreement § 2, art. III(a), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231 (West Supp. 1977).
139. United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 835 (3d Cir. 1975).
140. Agreement § 2, art. I, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977).
141. For an excellent summary of these abuses, see United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732,
737-40 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4. 1977) (No. 77-52). See
also the symposium in 9 Fed. Probation (Jul.-Sept. 1945).
142. "The prosecuting attorney who filed the charges knows that the prisoner can be found
when he is wanted and that all he has to do is have the sheriff call at the institution the date the
prisoner is to be discharged and take him into custody. Consequently he puts the case at the
bottom of the docket and forgets about it, safe in the knowledge that meanwhile the prisoner will
not be paroled." Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, 9 Fed. Probation 8, 9
(Jul.-Sept. 1945). See also The Detainer, supra note 2, at 1192; Correctional Process, supra note
2, at 417.
143. Detainer System, supra note 3, at 537; Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, supra note 3, at
770. "[V]itnesses might die, evidence disappear, and memories fade." United States v. Ford, 550
F.2d 732, 740 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
While the prosecutor might be able to preserve evidence for an eventual trial, the prisoner remains
in a poor place from which to prepare a defense. Id.; Schindler, Interjurisdictional Conflict and
the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 U. Cin. L. Rev. 179, 182 (1966); Correctional Process, supra note
2, at 423-24. Prior to Congress' adoption of the Agreement, the Supreme Court, in Smith v.
Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969), and Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970), held that a state which
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created restrictions on the prisoner's participation in rehabilitation programs.
On the theory that a wanted inmate is more likely than others to escape and
to be less trustworthy, 144 detainers were commonly denied trusty status, 45
became ineligible for special work and athletic programs, and were refused
release for sickness and death of relatives.146 In addition, these prisoners were
often denied parole and automatically placed under maximum security sur-
veillance.147 Detainers also created severe psychological disadvantages for
prisoners, since, regardless of their good behavior or desire to reform, the
detainer precluded any guarantee of release within a given time. 14 8 Moreover,
the grounds upon which detainers were based were not always legitimate.
They did not have to be supported by an indictment or information, 149 and
were often filed merely on suspicion.150 Prosecutors often lodged detainers
knowing that the resulting delay before trial would minimize the possibility
that the prisoner, if convicted, could serve the new sentence concurrently with
the old one. 15 1 The fact that an estimated one-half of all detainers lodged
were never prosecuted 52 indicates that many were groundless and lodged for
punitive reasons.1
5 3
has charges pending against a prisoner in a federal jurisdiction must use reasonable efforts to
bring him to trial so as not to violate his sixth amendment rights. These cases, cited in the
legislative history of the 1970 Act, gave impetus to its passage. See S. Rep. No. 91-1356, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4864, 4864; 116 Cong. Rec.
14000 (remarks of Rep. Poff), 38840 (remarks of Sen. 1Hruska).
144. See Correctional Process, supra note 2, at 419.
145. See Detainer System, supra note 3, at 537; Correctional Process, supra note 2, at 418-19.
146. See United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 737-38 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
147. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
148. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 739 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52); Speedy Trial, supra note 2, at 836 & n.63; Convicts in
Other Jurisdictions, supra note 3, at 770.
149. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52); Correctional Process, supra note 2, at 417 & n.3.
150. Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, 9 Fed. Probation 8, 9
(Jul.-Sept. 1945). The detained prisoner might also be wanted only for questioning, Correctional
Process, supra note 2, at 417.
151. Correctional Process, supra note 2, at 423; Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, supra note 3,
at 773.
152. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52); Speedy Trial, supra note 2, at 835 & n.59; Correctional
Process, supra note 2, at 417.
153. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text. "[M]any prosecutors are doubtless little
troubled by the realization that delay causes anxiety, makes the convict's eventual defense more
difficult, and eliminates the possibility of concurrent sentences. Many detainers are apparently
filed for punitive reasons; they are withdrawn shortly before the convict's release, having served
their purpose by curtailing prison privileges and preventing parole." Convicts in Other Jurisdic-
tions, supra note 3, at 772-73 (footnotes omitted). See also Correctional Process, supra note 2, at
423. In addition, if the detained prisoner's sentence was for a substantial length of time, trial on
the underlying charges after his release might be impos;ible because of the disappearance of
evidence, death of witnesses, and so forth. See United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 740 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
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A prisoner faced more problems if he were removed to the accusing state.
Depending on the agreement between the two jurisdictions, the defendant
could remain in the receiving jurisdiction for long periods, or be transported
back and forth between the jurisdictions to answer to charges, arraignments,
and other pretrial proceedings. 5 4 As a result, the prisoner usually developed
an adverse attitude toward prison and prison authorities which obstructed the
cultivation of a positive approach toward rehabilitation.15
At least two of the abuses of the detainer system, namely, post-transfer
delay and shuttling, are also present under the writ system of transfer. 5 6
Several circuits, however, have refused to acknowledge this and have held
that the purposes of the Agreement are inapplicable to the writ.' s 7 The Fifth
Circuit has argued that the Agreement was intended to apply only to detainers
filed by states, not to writs issued by the federal courts. 15 8 The First and Sixth
Circuits have emphasized that the writ contains none of the defects which the
Agreement corrects.1s 9 They have stressed that since the writ is executed
immediately it promotes the expeditious disposition of charges against a
prisoner and therefore has none of the antirehabilitative effects of detain-
ers. 
16 0
Closer analysis of these contentions, however, reveals that they are prem-
ised upon somewhat tenuous assumptions. It is true that indefinitely lodged
detainers created obstructions to treatment programs which are not present
under the writ, because the writ immediately removes the prisoner to the
accusing jurisdiction. 16 ' It is not true, however, that the abuses which the
Agreement was designed to eliminate cease after the prisoner is transferred.
Long delays before trial' 62 subject a prisoner to the same "uncertainties " 163
154. United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630, 634 (2d Cir. 1977); see United States v. Ford,
550 F.2d 732, 740 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No.
77-52).
155. Speedy Trial, supra note 2, at 836.
156. See United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647, slip op. at 9-10 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en
banc); United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
157. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kenaan,
557 F.2d 912, 916-17 (Ist Cir. 1977); United States v. Scallion. 548 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir.
1977); accord, United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1976) (MLanslield, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
158. The court found that "the primary concern of Article IV [was] elimination of abuses of
detainers by state-not of the abuses of the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum by federal
prosecutors." United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1172 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted).
159. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v Kenaan,
557 F.2d 912, 916-17 (1st Cir. 1977).
160. Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kenaan.
557 F.2d 912, 916-17 (1st Cir. 1977).
161. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J.. dissenting),
cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
162. See notes 171-78 infra and accompanying text. But see The Federal Speedy Trial Act of
1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. V 1975) (pretrial delay beyond the statutorily-defined limits
prohibited).
163. Agreement § 2, art. I, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977).
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regardless of the place of incarceration. The length of delay is not necessarily
reduced by the mere fact of transfer to federal custody. Nor, obviously, does
the possibility of return to the sending jurisdiction arise until after the
defendant arrives in the receiving jurisdiction. 164 The provisions of the
Agreement which mandate trial within specified periods 165 and which forbid
the prisoner's return prior to trial' 66 address these post-transfer defects, whose
occurrence does not depend on the mechanism by which custody is obtained.
In one case, 167 for example, a state prisoner facing federal charges was
shuttled between jurisdictions four times through the use of the writ, and was
not tried until approximately two and one-half years after he was first taken
into federal custody. 168 To allow such activity to continue because transfer
was conducted pursuant to a writ rather than a detainer is to permit
transgression of the statute on a technicality, a development which is incom-
patible with the Agreement's original remedial design. 169 The goals of
minimizing obstructions to treatment programs and expediting the orderly
disposition of chargesl 70 are thereby thwarted.
The First Circuit expressed concern lest the federal government be per-
mitted to evade the sanctions of the Agreement through use of the writ. t7
That concern, however, insofar as it related to the possibility of pretrial delay,
was "lessened if not dissipated" by the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974,
which creates time limits within which all federal defendants must be tried. '
72
Indeed, the Speedy Trial Act (Act)173 provides more advantageous speedy-
trial protection than the Agreement to prisoners transferred to federal custody
under the writ. 174 After a plea of not guilty is entered, the Act requires that a
defendant be brought to trial within sixty days from arraignment, which must
have been held no later than ten days after filing of the indictment or
information upon which the charges are based. 17  The maximum period
before trial mandated by the Act is therefore less than the Agreement's
164. Agreement § 2, arts. I1(d), IV(e), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231, 232 (West Supp. 1977).
165. Agreement § 2, arts. III(a), IV(c), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231, 232 (West Supp. 1977).
166. Agreement § 2, arts. III(d), IV(e), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231, 232 (West Supp. 1977).
167. United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1977).
168. Id. at 634. For other examples of post-transferal abuses, see cases cited note 194 itfra.
169. Agreement § 2, art. IX, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 234 (West Supp. 1977); see United States
ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 837 (3d Cir. 1975); People v. Esposito, 37 Misc. 2d 386,
391-92, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83, 88 (Queens County Ct. 1960).
170. Agreement § 2, art. I, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977).
171. See United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 916-17 (1st Cir. 1977).
172. Id. at 917.
173. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. V 1975).
174. At least one federal court has called for resolution of the discrepancy between the
maximum pretrial periods permitted under the statutes. See United States v. Sorrell, No.
76-1647, slip op. at 7, n.6a (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (Supp. V 1975); see H.R. Rep. No. 1508 at 30-31, 93rd Cong. 2d
Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7423-24. The indictment or
information must be filed within thirty days after arre!.t or service of summons. 18 U.S.C. §
3161(b) (Supp. V 1975).
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provisions of 120 days when the accusing authorities request custody or 180
days when the prisoner demands trial. 76
In addition to sanctions for pretrial delay, however, the Agreement also
provides penalties for shuttling. The Act provides nothing similar to the
Agreement's prohibition of the defendant's return to the original place of
imprisonment prior to trial.' 77 The obstructions to rehabilitation caused by
shuttling could thus continue unchecked against a prisoner transferred to
federal custody under the writ if his only remedy were under the Act. It is
apparent, then, that the alternative protection offered by the Act is only
partial, and, in view of the broader purposes of the Agreement, 78 it does not
justify excluding the writ from the latter's provisions.
Since transfer under the writ contains no safeguards against shuttling of
federal defendants, the question of whether the writ should be included
within the ambit of the Agreement depends to a great extent on whether
shuttling does in fact generate the abuses which the Agreement prevents.'79
The Second Circuit found that shuttling creates impediments to rehabilitation
which were sufficiently dangerous to warrant subjecting the writ to the
sanctions of the Agreement. 80 Specifically, the court argued that an impend-
ing federal trial and the possibility of an additional sentence create adverse
effects on a prisoner's morale.' 8 ' Shuttling the prisoner between jurisdictions
subjects him to the same "uncertainties" which impede participation in
176. Agreement § 2, arts. III(a), IV(c), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231. 232 (West Supp. 1977). The
Act enumerates certain periods that are excluded in computing the time limits. 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h) (Supp. V 1975). The Agreement's allowance of continuations for "good cause shown in
open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present," permits comparable tolling of the statutory
period. Agreement § 2, arts. I11(a), IV(c), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231, 232 (West Supp. 1977). The
Act, however, permits no continuations for general court congestion. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C)
(Supp. V 1975).
The Act requires that the attorney for the federal government, after learning of the prisoner's
whereabouts, promptly either seek custody of the prisoner or file a detainer against him. 18
U.S.C. § 3161(J)(I)(A) & (B) (Supp. V 1975). If the attorney chooses the latter course, the warden
must inform the prisoner of his right to demand trial, which if exercised must be communicated
to the prosecutor. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(j)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
177. Agreement § 2, arts. III(d), IV(e), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231, 232 (Vest Supp. 1977).
178. Agreement § 2, art. I, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977).
179. If the provisions against shuttling were intended only to expedite a speedy trial by
prohibiting time-consuming trips between jurisdictions, then the alternative protections against
delay afforded by the Speedy Trial Act would make it unnecessary to hold that the Agreement is
applicable to the writ. Such, however, was not the intention of the framers of the Agreement; the
effects of shuttling upon rehabilitation were the primary abuse sought to be checked. Speedy
Trial, supra note 2, at 855-56.
180.' United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596). The defendants in Mauro first appeared in the district
court pursuant to separate writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and were then returned to
state custody. Id. at 590-91. They were not produced for trial again until five months later, prior
to which they had moved for dismissals of their indictments based on the federal government's
violation of their rights under the Agreement. Id.
181. Id. at 593.
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treatment programs.' 82 The court's analysis requires further scrutiny.
Shuttling conceivably impedes rehabilitation in several ways. First, re-
habilitation programs require the prisoner's physical presence, which is inter-
rupted by numerous and often unnecessary trips between jurisdictions.18 3
Secondly, as the Second Circuit has observed, shuttling exacerbates the fears
and anxieties produced by the possibility of receiving an additional term of
imprisonment.' 8 4 Presumably the trips back and forth between jurisdictions
serve as a constant reminder to the prisoner of the imminence of the federal
trial. The chance of continued incarceration, which his excursions cannot help
but bring to mind, must certainly reduce the prisoner's motivation to engage
in treatment programs. The Third Circuit has added a third reason for the
prohibition against shuttling. If counsel is located in the indicting jurisdiction,
pretrial return to the sending jurisdiction may impede the prisoner's ability to
consult with his attorney. This in turn may impede the prisoner's guarantee to
a speedy trial.' 85 While, of course, prisoners may regard interjurisdictional
transfers as joyrides rather than interruptions of their treatment programs,
excluding the writ from the Agreement on that basis alone would ignore those
inmates who genuinely desire to participate in their rehabilitation. 8 6 Al-
182. Id. at 592-93; cf. United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 837 (3d Cir.
1975) (Agreement applies when state government issues writ for federal prisoner). What consti-
tutes a transfer within the meaning of the Agreement is also the subject of controversy. The
Second Circuit has held that the Agreement does not apply to a prisoner who is removed from
state prison for a few hours to answer to proceedings in federal court, if he had not been
imprisoned anywhere other than the sending state, and if his rehabilitation had not been
interrupted. United States v. Chico, 558 F.2d 1047, 1049 (2d Cir. 1977). It has also been held that
the Speedy Trial Act does not apply to a state detainee who had not yet been convicted of the
state charge and was not participating in any rehabilitation program. United States v. Roberts, 548
F.2d 665, 670-71 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2636 (1977). The Third Circuit, however,
ordered dismissal of an indictment against a state prisoner whose journey to federal court for
arraignment was "less than 10 miles," and who "was returned to the very cell from which he had
been taken that morning." United States v. Thompson, No. 76-1976, slip op. at 21 (3d Cir. Aug.
22, 1977) (en banc) (Garth, J., dissenting); accord, United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647 (3d Cir.
Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc). The case illustrates the severity and absurdity of the remedy provided
by the Agreement when the federal jurisdiction, as "receiving state," is geographically the same as
the state of imprisonment. The same result would follow, however, if a state court to which a
state prisoner was transferred were located near the boundaries of the sending state. While
Congress may have been guilty of poor drafting by permitting dismissal in the former instance,
United States v. Thompson, No. 76-1976, slip op. at 22 (en banc) (Garth, J., dissenting), the
latter illustration demonstrates that the original framers of the Agreement were no less myopic.
183. United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 837 (3d Cir. 1975). In the absence
of a rehabilitation program in the original place of imprisonment, no interruption can be said to
have occurred. In that instance vacation of the prisoner's (onviction would serve no demonstrable
purpose under the statute. United States v. Thompson, No. 76-1976, slip op. at 19 (3d Cir. Aug.
22, 1977) (en banc) (Weis, J., dissenting).
184. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596); United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830,
837 (3d Cir. 1975).
185. United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647, slip op. at 9-10 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc).
186. Moreover, one of the objectives of rehabilitation is to change such negative or apathetic
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though the argument that shuttling obstructs rehabilitation may be questioned
on the ground that the rehabilitative theory of punishment itself does not
work, 18 7 Congress, by adopting the Agreement in 1970, manifested its accep-
tance of rehabilitation as a goal not to be thwarted.188 It would make little
sense to exclude one class of prisoners from the protection of this statute
because of opposition to the objectives which motivated its enactment.
A final argument which has been advanced against classification of the writ
as a detainer within the meaning of the Agreement is that judicial control over
the issuance of the writ provides adequate safeguards against abuses.' 8 9 The
requirement that the writ be obtained through a court, however, does not
necessarily forestall possible evasions of the Agreement's purposes. The
federal habeas corpus statute, 190 under which the writ is issued, mandates
that the court review the grounds upon which that instrument is sought. 19 '
No comparable procedure exists when a detainer is filed. 192 The writ's
function, however, is completed upon transfer. 193 The judicial control exer-
cised before the writ is granted does not prevent the shuttling of a prisoner
back and forth between jurisdictions, nor does it prevent unreasonably long
pretrial delays once he has been transferred. 19 4
attitudes toward reform. See, e.g., Pierce, Rehabilitation in Correction: A Reassessment, 38 Fed.
Probation 14, 16 (June 1974).
187. Rehabilitation as an effective aim of punishment has received widespread criticism. See
Ardenaes, The General Preventive Effects-of Punishment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 949, 971 (1966);
Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 Yale L.J. 987, 1012-14 (1940); Hart, The Aims of
the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 407-08 (1958); Leinwand, Aversion Therapy:
Punishment as Treatment and Treatment as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 49 So. Cal. L. Rev.
880, 921-24 (1976). One critic, in noting the possible harmful effects of all rehabilitation pro-
grams, forewarned that "[t]he problem of selection of treatment raay reduce to the selection of the
form of disposal that has the least amount of content, since all content is likely to have
undesirable effects. By doing as little as possible we may be doing as little harm as possible. The
best (but illegal) treatment for prisoners may be a placebo!" L. Wilkins, Evaluation of Penal
Measures 76 (1969).
188. See Agreement § 2, art. I, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977). Moreover,
rehabilitation remains an integral component of our correctional system. See, e.g., Strunk v.
United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 (1973).
189. United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 917 (1st Cir. 1977).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
191. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
192. Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, 9 Fed. Probation 8, 9 (Jul.-
Sept. 1945); Correctional Process, supra note 2, at 417-18.
193. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 74, 97, 4 Cranch 75, 98 (1807); United States v. Sorrell,
No. 76-1647, slip op. at 8 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc).
194. For examples of shuttling and pretrial delay beyond the maximum permitted by the
Agreement after execution of the writ, see Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 358-59 (6th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596). See also United States v. Sorrell, No.
76-1647, slip op. at 2-4 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc) (shuttling); United States v. Thompson,
No. 76-1976, slip op. at 12 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc) (shuttling); United States v. Kenaan,
557 F.2d 912, 913-14 (Ist Cir. 1977) (shuttling); United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 735 (2d Cir.
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III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION AND
COLLATERAL ATTACK
Assuming that the Second Circuit's position in United States v. Mauro'95
prevails, and the writ is held to be a detainer within the meaning of the
Agreement, two questions of practical importance 96 remain: (1) will that
decision be applied retroactively to the date when the Agreement became
effective as to the federal government, and (2) may a prisoner collaterally
attack his conviction based on violation of the Agreement? 197 Given the
federal government's reliance on the writ as a tool for acquiring state
prisoners for prosecution, 98 it may safely be assumed that the fate of a
substantial number of federal convicts rests on the answers to these ques-
tions. 199
Two groups of prisoners would be affected by resolution of these issues.
The first is comprised of those transferred in violation of the Agreement who
have not exhausted their appeals, and to whom, therefore, only the issue of
retroactivity is important. The second group includes prisoners who were
transferred in violation of the Agreement but who have exhausted their
appeals. Vacation of the convictions of the latter group requires that both
retroactive effect and a right of collateral review be granted. If the Second
1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52) (delay); United States
v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1169-70 (5th Cir. 1977) (delay).
195. 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977)
(No. 76-1596).
196. Compliance with that decision would seem to impose no undue hardship upon federal
prosecuting authorities. The Third Circuit, in affirming two lower court decisions that the writ Is
a detainer, observed that "since the time of the decision of the three-judge panel in this case,
affirming the dismissal of the district court, the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania has been adhering to the mandates of the Detainer Agreement by
retaining federal custody over prisoners until they can be tried. No suggestion has been made to
this court that these procedures have impaired the efficient administration of the United States
Attorney's responsibilities in any way." United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647, slip op. at 3 n.3 (3d
Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc).
197. The Agreement took effect ninety days after December 9, 1970. Agreement § 8, 18
U.S.C.A. app., at 238 (West Supp. 1977). Since Congress did not provide for retroactive
application, the statute applies only from the date of enactment. See United States v. Estate of
Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 294 (1970); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 467 F.2d 59,
60 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
The Second Circuit has concluded that collateral review is unavailable for violation of the
Agreement. Edwards v. United States, No. 77-2048 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 1977) (per curiam); see notes
231-33 infra and accompanying text. As yet the other circuits have found no need to consider
either issue. The Third Circuit, however, has indicated that neither a right of collateral attack
nor retrospective effect would be given to its decision classifying the writ as a detainer under the
Agreement, at least where the prisoner had not demanded a speedy trial prior to trial. United
States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647, slip op. at 8 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc).
198. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732,. 742 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
199. While no statistics are available, there have been at least seven cases this year In the
Second Circuit raising issues under the Agreement. Brief and Appendix for United States at 13
n.*, United States v. Edwards, No. 77-2048 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Circuit's holding is given only prospective application, neither group may
raise the Agreement as a bar to future imprisonment. If retroactive applica-
tion is allowed, however, the rights of those who have exhausted their appeals
depend on their ability to institute collateral proceedings.
In determining whether to apply decisions retroactively or to permit collat-
eral attack, courts place emphasis on the effect of their holdings on the
defendants' guilt or innocence. 20 0 If a decision averts a "clear danger of
convicting the innocent,' 20 ' or creates a "fundamental defect" in the defen-
dant's conviction, 20 2 retroactive effect and a right of collateral appeal are
more likely to be granted. The Agreement protects no fundamental rights per
se, 20 3 and those prisoners allowed to benefit by its provisions are freed
without regard to whether they committed the crime for which they were
convicted. For this reason a decision equating the writ with a detainer under
the Agreement is likely to be denied retroactive application, thus denying its
protection to both of the above groups.
A. Retroactive Application
Retroactivity of judicial decisions is neither required nor prohibited by the
Constitution.20 4 In most cases the courts apply a three-pronged balancing test,
first implemented in the Supreme Court's early decisions requiring exclusion
of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment. 20 s The three
considerations are "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards,
and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application
of the new standards.
'20 6
If the purpose of the standard promulgated in the court's decision would be
furthered by retroactive application, the decision is likely to be given that
effect. 20 7 Thus, if the new rule affects "the very integrity of the fact-finding
process, ' 20 8 and averts a "clear danger of convicting the innocent, " 20 9 it is
200. Note, The Waivability by Guilty Plea of Retroactively Endowed Constitutional Rights,
41 Alb. L. Rev. 115, 136 (1977).
201. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); see Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965) (If decision affects "the very integrity of the fact-finding process," it will
be applied retroactively.).
202. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974); Hill v. United States. 368 U.S. 424,
428 (1962); accord, United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171, 1176 (2d Cir. 1974).
203. Speedy Trial, supra note 2, at 832; see United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174
(5th Cir. 1977).
204. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
205. See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); iUnkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965).
206. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); accord, United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531, 534 n.4 (1975); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969).
207. This purpose test is usually given primary weight among the three factors. Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969); Bannister v. United States, 446 F.2d 1250, 1257 (3d Cir.
1971).
208. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
209. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); accord, Berger v.
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usually given retroactive effect. Accordingly, decisions condemning the denial
of legal counsel during a criminal trial210 or preventing the use of coerced
confessions 2 1 are not limited to present or future infractions.
But if the departure from precedent is designed only to deter unconstitu-
tional state action, it is generally given prospective application. 2 12 Thus, for
example, where the Court ruled that illegally seized evidence was to be
excluded, the decision was applied prospectively only, because its purpose
was to deter police action in violation of the fourth amendment.2 13
It is doubtful that the purposes of a decision to impose the sanctions of the
Agreement on the federal government's use of the writ would be furthered by
retroactive application. The objectives of the Agreement are to minimize
obstructions to prisoner rehabilitation programs, to promote a speedy trial on
all outstanding charges, and to instill a spirit of cooperation between jurisdic-
tions when prisoners are transferred between them. 2 14 These goals affect
pretrial procedures, and their frustration does not in itself subvert the
factfinding process. 215 In addition, the discord between jurisdictions which
the Agreement was designed to prevent is not present when the writ is used to
transfer prisoners, since there apparently has been full cooperation by the
states with writ transfer. 21 6 Finally, even though a prisoner's ability and
desire to become rehabilitated may have been hampered by the delays and
shuttling that sometimes accompany issuance of the writ, the detrimental
effect of those abuses is not eliminated by his subsequent release. The harm
inflicted, namely, the obstruction of treatment programs, is not undone by
removal of the victim from the institution which administers those programs.
Under the second test a new rule will be applied only prospectively if it
appears that there was substantial reliance on the old rule, 217 as appears to be
the case here. Prior to 1976, the issue of whether the federal writ was subject
to the sanctions of the Agreement had never been considered. 218 Federal
California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969) (per curiam); see Bannister v. United States, 446 F.2d 1250, 1257
(3d Cir. 1971).
210. See, e.g., Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (964) (per curiam) (holding retroactive
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
211. See, e.g., United States ex rel. McNerlin v. Denno, 378 U.S. 575 (1964) (holding
retroactive Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)).
212. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965).
213. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965).
214. Agreement § 2, art. I, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977).
215. The Second Circuit has determined, in addition, that the Agreement safeguards no
constitutional guarantees. Edwards v. United States, No. 77-2048, slip op. at 4-5 (2d Cir. Oct.
25, 1977) (per curiam).
216. United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 916 n.8 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v.
Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1173 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977).
217. United States ex rel. Allison v. New Jersey, 418 F.2d 332, 340 (3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
218. United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596), was the first case to decide the issue. The Third
Circuit had held that state prosecutors must comply with the Agreement when acquiring a federal
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prosecutors, therefore, had no cause to believe that they might be required to
accomplish transfers under the writ within relatively narrow time frames. In
one analogous case, 2 19 in which the Supreme Court gave only prospective
application to a new procedural rule governing defendants' guilty pleas,220 the
Court stressed that the new rule had previously been followed by only one
circuit, and that over eighty-five percent of all convictions in the federal
courts were obtained pursuant to guilty pleas.2 2' The new rule in question, if
adopted, will have been followed by only two circuits, and then only since
1976.222 Similarly, virtually all transfers of prisoners to the federal govern-
ment are conducted through the writ, 223 and it may reasonably be surmised
that many of them were not conducted in accordance with the Agreement's
requirements.
Finally, retroactive application of a decision that the writ is a detainer
would adversely affect the administration of justice, since it would probably
lead to release of a large number of federal prisoners, many of whom are
guilty of serious crimes. All convicts transferred under the writ whose return
to the sending jurisdiction antedated trial 224 and a large percentage of those
whose trial extended beyond the statutory maximum 22S would be discharged.
Court calendars would also be clogged by government petitions alleging that
the continuances were for "good cause. '226
B. Collateral Attack
Assuming that retroactive effect is given to a decision equating the writ
with a detainer under the Agreement, the future incarceration of federal
convicts whose rights under the statute have been violated, and who either
prisoner pursuant to a state writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum in 1975. United States ex rel.
Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 839 (3d Cir. 1975). In 1977 this interpretation was extended by
the Third Circuit to transfers of state prisoners to federal custody pursuant to the federal writ.
United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc); United States v.
Thompson, No. 76-1976 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc). One dissenter warned that it was
"questionable" whether the majority's decision would be held nonretroactive, since, in light of
Esola, the new ruling was foreshadowed to some extent and did not overrule "clear past
precedent on which the litigants may have relied." United States v. Thompson, No. 76-1976, slip
op. at 23 n.1 (en banc) (Garth, J., dissenting) (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,
106 (1971)). This second test, however, has been held to be the least important of the three
factors. United States ex rel. Allison v. New Jersey, 418 F.2d 332, 340 (3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
219. Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969).
220. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
221. Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 833 (1969).
222. United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en bane); United States v.
Mauro, 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No.
76-1596).
223. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
224. See Agreement § 2, arts. II1(d), IV(e), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231, 232 (West Supp. 1977).
225. See id. arts. III(a), IV(c), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231, 232 (West Supp. 1977).
226. See id.
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lost on appeal or lost their right to appeal, 227 will depend on their ability to
institute collateral proceedings. 228 It is, however, doubtful that the statutory
prerequisites for permitting collateral relief are met when a conviction is
obtained in violation of the Agreement. Under the federal collateral review
statute, a prisoner serving a federal sentence may move the sentencing court
to "vacate, set aside or correct the sentence" in three situations 229 -when the
claimed error (1) is the sentencing court's lack of jurisdiction, (2) deprives the
defendant of a constitutional right, or (3) if there is a violation of a United
States law which leads to a "complete miscarriage of justice.1230 In a recent
decision, the Second Circuit has held that none of these requirements are
satisfied when the ground for attack is transgression of the provisions of the
Agreement. 23 1 The court declared that "[n]o argument is required to show"
that the alleged error was not of constitutional magnitude and that the
sentencing court did not lose its jurisdiction when the petitioner was returned
to the original place of imprisonment prior to trial . 2 3 2 Finally, the court found
that "[m]ere recital of the facts" demonstrated that the claimed defect did not
constitute a "miscarriage of justice" sufficient to warrant the requested
227. Notice of appeals in federal criminal cases must be filed within statutorily defined time
limits. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b).
228. A decision that a statute has retroactive effect does not necessarily create a concomitant
right of collateral review. As in the present controversy, where there has been a change In
statutory law, additional factors are taken into account Comment, Availability of Federal
Post-Conviction Relief in Light of a Subsequent Change in Law, 66 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
117, 130 (1975). See, e.g., United States v. Travers, 514 F.2cd 1171 (2d Cir. 1974), where the court,
after granting retroactive effect to a statutory change, required more before allowing collateral
attack. The court noted that the petitioner had been convicted of an act that was no longer
criminal and that petitioner had fully utilized the appellate process before initiating collateral
proceedings. Id. at 1174-76; see Comment, Availability of Federal Post-Conviction Relief in Light
of a Subsequent Change in Law, 66 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 117, 131-33 (1975); notes 258-71
infra and accompanying text.
229. "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence,' or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate,
set aside or correct the sentence.
"A motion for relief may be made at any time." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
230. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S.
424, 428 (1962)); see United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1976). The legislative
history of the statute indicates that it was enacted as a response to the practical difficulties that
had arisen in the federal courts' administration of their habeas corpus jurisdiction. United States
v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952). Its purpose was to provide the same rights that had
previously been given under habeas corpus in a more convenient forum, the sentencing court. Id.
See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969). Thus the statute is available only for
defects which the original habeas corpus attack would have remedied: lack of jurisdiction,
constitutional error, or sentences unlawfully imposed. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collat-
eral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 151 (1971).
231. Edwards v. United States, No. 77-2048 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 1977) (per curiam).
232. No. 77-2048, slip op. at 4 (2 Cir. Oct. 25, 1977).
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relief. 233
Opposition to the argument that the Agreement protects no constitutional
guarantees, and therefore cannot be raised collaterally on that ground,
234
seems unlikely. The Agreement, while aimed in part at securing speedy trials
for federal defendants, safeguards no sixth amendment rights per se. 235 Delay
beyond the statutorily prescribed time limits, coupled with other circum-
stances, such as lack of reasonable grounds for the delay and the defendant's
demand prior to trial for prompt disposition of the charges, may well create
constitutional infirmities. Mere delay does not, however, standing alone,
ordinarily result in an infringement on constitutional speedy trial rights.
2 3 6
Similarly, return of the defendant to the sending jurisdiction prior to trial
results in no constitutional defects. 2
37
233. Id. at 5.
234. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
235. "The thrust of [the Agreement] is not to protect the convict's right to a speedy trial per
se, but rather to protect him from the particular disabilities engendered by an untried detainer
pending against him while he is serving a prison term." Speedy Trial, supra note 2, at 832; see
United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir. 1977).
236. Barker v. W'ingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972). In Barker, the Supreme Court found "no
constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified
number of days or months." Id. The same may be said for change of locations prior to trial.
237. Generally, only a lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised collaterally, since the
right to object to personal jurisdiction is waivable and ordinarily must be raised prior to trial. 8
Moore's Federal Practice 12.03[2] (2d ed. 1977). Relief from waiver may be granted "for cause
shown." Federal R Crim. P. 12(f). In determining whether to grant such relief, courts consider
the merits to determine whether the defendant would be prejudiced by enforcing the waiver, they
may also consider whether the defendant had notice of the defect or could have obtained such
notice. 8 Moore's Federal Practice, supra 12.0313]. The Agreement does not affect the determi-
nation of guilt or innocence, and thus defendants are not prejudiced by violation of the statute per
se. See notes 261-71 infra and accompanying text. If the writ is held to be a detainer under the
Agreement, those defendants transferred under the writ whose rights under the Agreement were
violated prior to such a determination could not have obtained notice of the defect prior to their
trials. In that instance, if the Agreement were considered a matter of personal jurisdiction, relief
from waiver might be granted, and collateral attack allowed.
It is submitted, however, that violation of the Agreement does not affect personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. The language of the statute indicates that, if the accusing jurisdiction
requests custody of the prisoner, the latter's right to contest the legality of his delivery and
appearance before the court is not affected. Agreement § 2, art. IV(d), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 232
(West Supp. 1977). This means that the court's jurisdiction over his person is determined by the
circumstances of the transfer itself, not by any transgression of the Agreement which may occur
subsequent to his arrival.
Alternatively, when the prisoner, pursuant to his rights under the Agreement, requests final
disposition of the charges against him, this operates as consent to production of his body in any
court where his presence may be required to carry out the purposes of the Agreement. Id. art
I(e), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231-32 (West Supp. 1977). Consent is one method by which
jurisdiction over the person is obtained. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d
Cir. 1974). It is, of course, arguable that, after return to the sending jurisdiction or the expiration
of the statutory time period prior to trial, any further appearances are not within the purposes of
the Agreement and therefore do not constitute consent. Violation of the statute, therefore, would
strip the court of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held, however, that even though
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Whether violation of the Agreement is subject to collateral attack on the
ground that it creates a jurisdictional defect238 in the sentencing court has
provoked some controversy. One federal district court has argued that the
language of the Agreement compels the conclusion that all proceedings after a
violation of its provisions are a nullity.239 The statute provides that, upon
return of a prisoner to the original place of imprisonment prior to trial, the
indictment, information, or complaint "shall not be of any further force or
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with preju-
dice."'240 This mandatory terminology, the court held, operates to strip a court
of jurisdiction whenever such violation of the Agreement occurs, since the
indictment becomes void immediately upon the prisoner's return. 24 1
In view of several courts' construction of the Agreement, 242 however, it
a defendant is brought before a court against his will, this does not invalidate a subsequent
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
In Frisbie, the defendant, who was living in Chicago, had been forcibly seized by Michigan
officers and brought to Michigan to stand trial for murder. He alleged that his trial and
conviction were in violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause and the Federal
Kidnaping Act. 342 U.S. at 520. The Court, in denying his petition for habeas corpus relief, held
that "the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been
brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' "Id. at 522 (footnote
omitted). This conclusion was premised "on the sound ba.is that due process of law is satisfied
when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized [sic] of the
charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural
safeguards." Id. The Court also noted that the Federal Kidnaping Act, which petitioner raised as
an alternative ground for relief, contained no "sanction barring a state from prosecuting persons
wrongfully brought to it by its officers. It may be that Congress could add such a sanction." Id. at
523 (footnote omitted). Insofar as the Agreement does bar further prosecution after its violation,
the case is distinguishable. Unlike the statute in Frisbi., however, the Agreement does not
concern the legality of the initial transfer, by which personal jurisdiction is obtained, but
prohibits certain post-transfer conduct.
The Frisbie doctrine has been questioned in instances where the defendant's presence before
the court is procured by methods which violate fundamental principles of due process recognized
after Frisbie was decided. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. It would seem,
however, that in cases other than those where constitutional rights are violated or where the
conduct by which jurisdiction over the defendant is obtained is "egregious," a subsequent
conviction on the underlying charges will not be vacated. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,
510 F.2d 62, 64-66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). As discussed above, the
Agreement protects no constitutional guarantees per se, and transgression of its provisions does
not amount to conduct in itself so reprehensible as to mandate vacation of an otherwise validly
imposed sentence.
238. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
239. Enright v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). This reasoning was
rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Edwards v. United States, No. 77-2048
(2d Cir. Oct. 25, 1977). See also notes 242-48 infra and accompanying text.
240. Agreement § 2, art. IV(e), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 232 (West Supp, 1977). The identical
language appears in art. 111(d), which prescribes the pena-dty for exceeding the statutory maxi-
mum period within which trial must be commenced. Thus the same argument is applicable to
violation of this provision.
241. Enright v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 1056, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
242. See United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 743-44 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46
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would seem that its violation creates no jurisdictional defect, and therefore
that no collateral review is permissible on that ground. The federal collateral
attack statute permits jurisdictional errors to be raised at any time, including
after trial or appeal, because a court's subject matter jurisdiction can never be
waived. 243 The decisions in question, however, have declared that a pris-
oner's right not to be returned to the original place of imprisonment prior to
trial is waivable. 244 If the prisoner requests24s to be returned, he can no
longer allege that the Agreement was violated on that ground. 246 Since the
statute was designed to remedy obstructions to rehabilitation programs247 and
create personal rights or privileges in favor of prisoners, 248 it seems reason-
able to conclude that they may elect not to exercise those rights. If, then, the
Agreement's sanctions are waivable, to conclude that violation of the statute
destroys the court's subject matter jurisdiction, which is nonwaivable, poses
an inconsistency which impugns the latter construction.
Drawing an analogy between the provisions of the Agreement which
establish time limits within which trial must be held and statutes of limitation
which bar an action after the lapse of a certain period is helpful in this
U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174
(5th Cir. 1977); Enright v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 1056, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
243. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2); see United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659, 662-63 (2d Cir.
1976).
244. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir.
1977); Enright v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 1056, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). To constitute a
waiver there must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 591 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938). The Second Circuit has held that a defendant may allege a violation of the Agreement
for the first time on appeal. United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630, 635 (2d Cir. 1977). In
Cyphers the appellant was found not to have known, before trial, that a detainer had been lodged
against him; therefore he could not be said to have waived his rights under the statute. Id. This
situation will hopefully be ameliorated by the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, which mandates
that prisoners be informed of any detainers against them. 18 U.S.C. § 31610111I1B) (Supp. V
1975).
245. The decisions are unclear as to whether the defendant must be cognizant of his rights
under the Agreement at the time of his request. The Second Circuit would seem to require such
knowledge. See United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 591 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1596); United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630,
635 (2d Cir. 1977). The Fifth Circuit, however, has held that a request to be returned to the
original place of imprisonment was a waiver and did not indicate that at the time of the request
knowledge of the statutory rights was required. United States v. Scallion. 548 F.2d 1168, 1170.
1174 (5th Cir. 1977).
246. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52); United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir.
1977); Enright v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 1056, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Second Circuit
reasoned that the request operates as a waiver because the statute is intended for the prisoner's
benefit. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d at 742.
247. Agreement § 2, art. I, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 230 (West Supp. 1977).
248. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214-15 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-52).
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context. The same justifications given for the requirement that the defense of
the statute of limitations be raised before trial and not in a later collateral
proceeding 249 also support the argument that the Agreement's benefits are
waivable, and are therefore unavailable collaterally. The first reason is that
raising the defense at trial gives the prosecution a chance to introduce
evidence showing that the defendant falls within one of the exceptions to the
particular statute of limitations. 25 0 For example, the defendant may have
been a fugitive and have eluded apprehension. 25 ' The same justification for
denying collateral review applies to the Agreement's time limitations for trial,
which also allow continuations for periods of reasonable delay. 25 2 Here too
the prosecution should have the opportunity to offer evidence rebutting the
defendant's contention that the Government delayed beyond the statutory
period. 25 3
The second reason why courts have denied collateral relief based on
violation of the statute of limitations is that such statutes are "personal
privilege" defenses. 254 Like the Agreement, statutes of limitation are designed
to benefit those against whom claims or charges have been made. Courts that
have discussed either of them have held that they are therefore waivable. 255
Failure to raise the statute of limitations at an early time can prejudice the
plaintiff's case by denying him the opportunity to raise his claim in another
forum in which the action has not been barred. 256 Similarly, allowing
violation of the Agreement to be raised collaterally prejudices the Government
by permitting time-consuming, costly, and essentially unnecessary trials and
249. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2); Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 135
(1917); Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739, 743 (loth Cir. 1964); United States v. Taylor, 207
F.2d 437, 438 (2d Cir. 1953) (per curiam); Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1939);
Capone v. Aderhold, 65 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1933).
250. United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 179 (1872); Capone v. Aderhold, 65 F.2d
130, 131 (5th Cir. 1933).
251. See United States v. White, 28 F. Cas. 568, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1837) (No. 16,677).
252. Agreement § 2, arts. III(a), IV(c), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231, 232 (West Supp. 1977).
253. The analogy fails, of course, when the violation is the return to the sending jurisdiction
prior to trial. Agreement § 2, art. III(d), IV(e), 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 231, 232 (West Supp. 1977).
In that instance no extensions or exceptions are permitted, and therefore no corresponding need to
offer evidence to establish the exceptions exists. Id.
254. Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152, 1155 (2d Cir. 1968).
255. Id.; see Hayden v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 1292, 1294-95 (6th Cir. 1974); see note 242
supra and accompanying text.
256. See Hayden v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 1292, 1295 (6th Cir. 1974) (defendant waived
statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it for 30 months and thereby inducing plaintiff to
voluntarily dismiss pending state action). See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 148 (1970). It may be argued, in criticism
of this analogy, that statutes of limitation do not ordinarily contain the Agreement's language that
upon violation the indictment "shall be of no further force or effect," and that this terminology
indicates that transgression of the Agreement destroys the court's jurisdiction and is not merely a
waivable defense. Such reasoning overlooks the fact, however, that while a statute of limitation
may not explicitly state that noncompliance with its provisions, if alleged at trial, renders the
underlying indictment ineffective, that is certainly its effect.
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appeals.2 -7 In sum, if the comparison of the Agreement with statutes of
limitations is valid, and since the statutory rights conferred by the former are
waivable, it is error to conclude that violation of the Agreement creates a
defect in the sentencing court's subject matter jurisdiction, a defense which
can never be waived.
The same result would probably be reached under the third situation in
which the federal collateral attack statute allows collateral review-when
sentences are imposed in violation of the laws of the United States.25 5 The
Agreement, since it is a federal law, fits neatly within this category. Yet not
all errors of law committed by the sentencing court may be raised collater-
ally.2 s9 Which claims are cognizable depends, initially, on whether they were
available on appeal. If the alleged violation could have been raised on appeal
but was not, then it may not be reviewed collaterally.26 0 Therefore, those
federal convicts who, since the Agreement was enacted by Congress, have
had detainers filed against them, and whose rights under the statute were
subsequently violated, cannot resort to collateral proceedings to set aside their
convictions, since the benefits of the Agreement were available to them at
trial.
A different test for collateral attack would apply to those prisoners who
were transferred to federal custody pursuant to a writ, but before any
decision 261 to classify the writ as a detainer within the meaning of the
Agreement. If, as in their case, the claim is one that could not have been
raised on appeal, it still may not be reviewed collaterally unless it constitutes
a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice .... ,,262 It is debatable whether deprivation of the statutory rights
under the Agreement constitutes a "miscarriage of justice" so "fundamental"
as to entitle prisoners transferred pursuant to the writ to reversal of their
convictions upon collateral review after a subsequent extension of the Agree-
ment to include the writ. Previous decisions granting collateral relief under
this test have concerned changes in law which, had they been in effect prior to
conviction or affirmance, would have exonerated the defendants. 263 In one
257. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 142, 148 (1970).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
259. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974).
260. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477 n.10 (1976) (exception for constitutional claims);
Alfano v. United States, 555 F.2d 1128, 1130 (2d Cir. 1977). This is premised on the rule that
habeas corpus (which the federal collateral attack statute was created to mirror, see note 230
supra) is not a substitute for an appeal. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974); Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1947) (listing exceptions to the general rule).
261. See United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc); United
States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214-15 (U.S. Oct.
4, 1977) (No. 76-1596).
262. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). Even claims that have been raised on
appeal must show a "fundamental defect." See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333. 346 (1974);
United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171, 1176 (2d Cir. 1974).
263. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974); United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659,
667 (2d Cir. 1976).
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recent Supreme Court case, 2 64 the petitioner was convicted for failing to
report to his draft board in violation of a Selective Service regulation which
accelerated the induction of delinquent draft registrants.2 65 After conviction
and appeal, the Supreme Court held in a separate case that the regulation was
punitive, and thus had no legislative sanction.2 66 The petitioner then moved
to vacate his sentence based on the intervening change in the law, which in
effect de-criminalized the conduct for which he was sentenced. The Court
held that the issue could be raised in a collateral proceeding, observing that
petitioner's "conviction and punishment are for an act that the law does not
make criminal. ' 267 In contrast, the procedural guarantees of the Agreement
do not determine a defendant's guilt or innocence, which remains unchanged
despite a subsequent widening of the scope of that Act. Of course, the
defendant's right to a speedy trial may be prejudiced by the extension of
proceedings beyond the statutory maximum.2 "'8 However, the relation of such
a violation to the substance of the offense charged is much more remote than
in instances where the subsequent change in law has completely invalidated
the crime upon which conviction was based. The possible prejudice here, as
in similar procedural cases, 269 is not likely to result in the "miscarriage of
justice" 270 necessary to warrant collateral relief.27 1
Aside from the legal arguments against allowing a right of collateral attack,
there are several policy reasons for disallowing the vacation of convictions in
collateral proceedings when the alleged error is a violation of the Agreement.
As discussed above, release would not be predicated upon the convict's guilt
or innocence. 272 In addition, many trials and appeals in our already over-
264. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
265. Id. at 334-39.
266. Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295, 301-08 (1970).
267. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974). Similarly, in United States v.
Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1976), the intervening change in law resulted in the petitioner's
imprisonment "for something that was not a federal . . . offense." Id. at 665.
268. Perhaps in this situation the more efficacious allegation would be violation of the sixth
amendment. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972). It is, however, unlikely that
collateral review will be granted to overturn convictions when the only prejudice is to the
rehabilitation program in the prisoner's original place of incarceration.
269. Denial of an opportunity to present a defense which future rulings indicate should have
been allowed is not reviewable in collateral proceedings. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 183-84
(1947). Refusal to grant relief on these grounds is significant, because conceivably the availability
of a defense to a crime affects the determination of guilt more than the time within which trial
must be had, or the place where it must be awaited. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428
(1962); Alfano v. United States, 555 F.2d 1128, 1130 (2d Cir. 1977).
270. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).
271. The Second Circuit found that a claim alleging violation of the Agreement was "even
less appealing than those [it had] recently held insufficient to warrant § 2255 relief in AIfano v.
United States, 555 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1977) (violation of requirement for sealing intercepted
communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) ), and in Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d 106 (2d
Cir. 1977) (alleged failure to comply with amended F.R.Cr. P. 11 with respect to guilty pleas)."
Edwards v. United States, No. 77-2048, slip op. at 5 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 1977).
272. See notes 262-71 supra and accompanying text,
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crowded court system would become wastes of time, since a prisoner's right to
attack his indictment and void the conviction would be preserved after
appeal. 273 Finally, the availability of collateral attack proceedings, which
may be initiated at any time during imprisonment, 274 can frustrate a central
goal of punishment. Prisoners aware of this outlet may not be made to realize
that their sentences were justly imposed, and that their rehabilitation is
necessary. 275 In view of the rehabilitative purposes of the Agreement, it seems
anomalous to create a supplemental remedy for its violation which per-
petuates the abuses which it was designed to forestall.
2 7 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The writ and a detainer are in several respects dissimilar, but both in
operation generate many of the abuses which the Agreement was intended to
remedy. It is arguable that Congress may have intended to limit the federal
government's participation in the Agreement, and to place no strictures on
federal prosecutors' power to obtain custody of prisoners through the writ.
2 77
In fact, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary has adopted this view in its
proposed amendments to the Agreement. 278 But in view of the above discus-
sion, 27 9 it is doubtful that such an interpretation furthers all the objectives of
the statute. The ease with which federal authorities have apparently accom-
modated their procedures to the terms of the Agreement when operating
under the writ,280 as well as the likelihood that neither a right of collateral
attack nor retroactive effect will be allowed, 28 ' demonstrate that the practical
obstacles to the broader classification adopted by the Second and Third
Circuits are minimal. Given these circumstances, and in the absence of a clear
legislative intent to the contrary, classifying the writ as a detainer within the
meaning of the Agreement would seem to be the fair solution.
Daniel E. Casagrande
273. See United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir. 1977). This criticism has
been directed to collateral review in all criminal cases. Friendly. Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 148 (1970); see United States v.
Kaylor, 491 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated sub nom. United States v. Hopkins, 418
U.S. 909 (1974).
274. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
275. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 142, 146 (1970). "Neither is it an adequate answer that repentance and rehabilitation may
be thought unlikely in many of today's prisons. That is a separate and serious problem, demand-
ing our best thought but irrelevant to the issue here." Id. (footnote omitted).
276. Agreement § 2, art. I, 18 U.S.C.A. app., at 250 (West Supp. 1977).
277. Clarifying legislation may be necessary to prevent the absurd results when, for example,
the "territory" of the state jurisdiction to which a prisoner is returned prior to trial is the same as
that of the federal receiving jurisdiction. See note 182 supra. Classification of the writ as a
detainer under the Agreement, however, creates no anomalies not already present under the
existing terminology.
278. See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
279. See pt. II supra.
280. United States v. Sorrell, No. 76-1647, slip op. at 3 n.3 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1977) (en banc).
281. See pt. III supra.
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